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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V. 
GRACE HELEN DAVIE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT DAVIE 
Criminal No. 081500074 
Appellate Case No. 20100189-CA 
Judge: G. Michael Westfall 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this case originates in the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78A-4-103(2)(e) (1953, as amended), in that it involves an appeal from a 
court of record in a criminal case not involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony. The 
case does not involve multiple parties or multiple claims requiring certification pursuant to Rule 
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Issues presented for appeal in this case by Appellant are as follows: 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the Appellant guilty of the 
offenses based upon its findings? 
ISSUE No. 2: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to find the Appellant guilty 
of the offenses by proof beyond a reasonable doubt? 
ISSUE No. 3: Whether or not the trial court erred in sentencing the Appellant? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is believed to be one of "correctness" as it applies to questions of 
law and the interpretation of statute. It is a standard of "clearly erroneous" as it applies to 
questions of fact. State v. Ramirez. 1817 P.2d 774 and State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah 
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App 1991); see also State v. Gibbons, 770 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989) and State v. Gerrard, 574 P.2d 
885 (Utah 1978). The trial court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably. See State v. 
Commer, 2002 UT App. 219 at paragraph 11,51 P.3d 55 (quoting State v. Whittel 1999 UT 96, 
at paragraph 20, 989 P.2d 52) cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). The Court of Appeals 
accords no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court but reviews them for correctness. 
State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, at paragraph 8, 20 P.3d 300. The trial court findings of fact made in 
conjunction with its discretion will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. See State v. 
Thurman, 911 P.2d 371 (Utah 1996). In assessing claims of insufficient evidence in support of 
trial verdict, the viewing court sustains unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence or if it 
reaches a definite or firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 
83, at paragraph 11; see also State v. Goodwin, 763 P.2d 991, 992 (Utah 1987).When reviewing 
a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, the Court of Appeals sustains the trial court's judgment 
unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence. State v. Hartman, 2004 UT App. 175; see 
also State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App. 106, 999 P.2d 1252. Sentencing, being indeterminate in the 
State of Utah, falls to the discretion of the trial court judge. See State v. Smith, 842 P.2d 908 
(Utah 1992). Moreover, exercise of that discretion is not unlimited and it may not be exercised 
on the basis of unreliable information. State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Appellant is aware of no statutory provision that is dispositive and believes the 
following apply: 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-8-508(1) (1953, as amended) 
(1) A person is guilty of the third degree felony of tampering with a witness if, believing 
that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, or with the 
intent to prevent an official proceeding or investigation, he attempts to induce or 
otherwise cause another person to: 
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(a) testify or inform falsely; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, or item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has been 
summoned. 
(2) A person is guilty of the third degree felony of soliciting or receiving a bribe as a 
witness if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration of his doing 
any of the acts specified under Subsection (1). 
(3) The offense of tampering with a witness or soliciting or receiving a bribe under 
this section does not merge with any other substantive offense committed in the course of 
committing any offense under this section. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-5-102 (1953, as amended) 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to 
another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to 
another. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE of the CASE: This is a criminal case that is interesting in consideration of 
the phrase "attempts to induce or otherwise cause" in the context of a third degree felony charge 
of tampering with a witness. There is also a question regarding sufficiency of evidence where the 
testimony of the victim is clearly inconsistent and presents substantial concern regarding her 
credibility. The underlying circumstances begin on or about the 6th day of July, 2008. The victim 
and her husband, the McFalls, had not been married long and on that night a witness observed 
them arguing, one might even say they were fighting. After some pushing and shoving where the 
victim's husband was trying to get the keys from her, he pulled the truck in the back and disabled 
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it so she could not leave. Local law enforcement was called and Mr. McFall was arrested and 
charged with domestic violence. The next day, the Appellant who was the victim's mother-in-law 
talked with her about the fact that in consequence of this new charge being made against him and 
in light of his prior criminal history, Mr. McFall would likely go to prison. The Appellant told 
her that if he did, he would kill himself. The Appellant informed her that she could recant her 
statement to law enforcement and in that context offered a suggestion in the form of a 
hypothetical and told her she should be imaginative. The Appellant took her to Beaver, Utah, to 
speak with her husband's probation officer. The probation officer informed the victim that he 
would have to recant her statement to Officer Cox who had interviewed her the night before. The 
Appellant took her home where shortly thereafter she met with Officer Cox. He recorded the 
second interview, this time reading her Miranda rights. The officer went to some length 
convincing her thait she should not recant or change her story. In doing so, the officer used a form 
of interrogation where he would state what he believed transpired and have her acknowledge it. 
Under such interrogation, the victim implicated her mother-in-law for witness tampering. The 
Appellant was arrested the next day. 
The second incident occurred in October, 2008. Mr. McFall was out on bail and he and 
his wife were now living in a trailer house on the property of the Appellant and her husband a 
few miles outside of Milford, Beaver County, Utah. On the night in question, the victim and her 
husband were at home entertaining a young teenage boy and two young ladies from Las Vegas. 
One of the girls was sixteen years old and, notwithstanding, there was some drinking and some 
late-night partying. The victim claims that she had not been drinking but was nauseous to the 
point of being sick and believed at the time that she might be pregnant. In the middle of this, the 
victim got mad at her husband, conversed with her mother-in-law and arranged to borrow the car 
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to go into town to buy cigarettes. Instead she went to the nearest ATM and drained out their joint 
account and this lead to another altercation between the victim and her husband over about 
$280.00. Local law enforcement was called out. This time, the victim did not tell law 
enforcement that her husband had beat her up but that her mother-in-law did it. The Appellant 
was originally charged on two counts of tampering with a witness, each a third degree felony, and 
assault, a class A misdemeanor. 
B. COURSE of PROCEEDINGS and DISPOSITION: The Appellant was arrested on the 
8th day of July, 2008, based upon information provided to law enforcement through the 
interrogation of her daughter-in-law, Jennifer McFall. Her daughter-in-law the day before had 
tried to recant her statement regarding an incident of domestic violence accusing her husband, 
Jeremiah McFall. She more or less acknowledged to law enforcement that her mother-in-law had 
put her up to it. Appellant waived the preliminary hearing in February, 2009, and the case was set 
in the normal course for a two-day jury trial. The parties stipulated to waive the jury trial on the 
20thdayofOctober,2009.A one-day bench trial was held a few days later on the 22nd day of 
October, 2009. The Appellant was found guilty by the trial court judge on the first count of 
witness tampering and assault. She was sentenced on the 27 day of January, 2010 and placed on 
thirty-six months supervised probation with standard terms and fine and requiring that she serve 
120 days in the Beaver County Jail, ninety days were to be stayed if she successfully served thirty 
days in five-day increments with no good time. She was placed on house arrest during the time 
she served the thirty days in jail when not physically incarcerated. She was allowed to attend 
church services and leave her residence for medical treatment and counseling. She was to provide 
the Court proof of completion of her mental health counseling and she was not to possess alcohol 
or drinks which contained alcohol or frequent establishments where such was the chief item of 
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sale. She was not to possess drugs during her probation which were not prescribed by her 
physician. She was to have only one physician. Medications taken into the jail where to be 
brought in their original containers. Because of her serious health issues disclosed to the Court at 
the time of sentencing or prior thereto, the Appellant was unable to serve the time in jail without 
medication. Notice of Appeal was filed on the 23rd day of February, 2010, together with a request 
for transcripts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On the sixth day of July, 2008, the victim, Jennifer McFall, and her husband, Jeremiah 
McFall, were living in Milford, Beaver County, State of Utah, with the Larsens. See the trial 
transcript at page 9, in the Record at 145. 
2. They were married on the 31st day of May of the same year. On that particular Sunday 
night they got into an argument. Id at page 10. Mr. McFall started calling his wife vulgar names 
saying that he wanted a divorce. Jennifer was driving the pickup truck. Id. She threw the keys out 
of the truck when he was trying to get them away from her. Id. He began grabbing her to get the 
keys and managed to get out of the truck. Id. He came after her and grabbed her wrist saying that 
he was not going to let her go. He wanted to go inside and talk. Id. She did not want to talk. Id. 
They were on the front sidewalk. Id. Jeremiah tried to pick his wife up and carry her in the house 
and she was trying to kick her way free out of his arms. Id at page 4. Both fell on the ground and 
he proceeded to sit on top of her and pin her arms down with his knees. Id. He was yelling at her 
to give him the keys and that they needed to go inside and talk. Id. She was yelling at him to get 
off of her. Id. This went on for about five minutes. Id. 
3. Mrs. Carolyn Pearson lived close enough to see what happened that night. She was 
with her grandkids. Id at page 38. When they were sitting on the porch a white truck came 
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screaming around the corner and pulled up in front of the Larsen house. Id. Two individuals got 
out of it. She didn't know either one of them. Id. They were fighting and he was pushing her 
down on the ground, she was screaming "no, no, no" and trying to get away from him. Id. He 
jumped in the truck and sped to the back of the house toward the alley. Id. 
4. She called the police. Id. Jennifer came to her house and told her that Jeremiah was 
dismantling her truck so that she could not drive it. Id. Mrs. Pearson informed her that the police 
were on their way and asked her to stay in the front yard so she would not be so worried about 
her. Id. When local law enforcement arrived, Jeremiah was inside the Larsen home and Jennifer 
was standing in the front yard. Id. One officer went in to speak with Jeremiah and the other spoke 
to her. He asked her a few questions. Id. He did not have her go into much detail at that point and 
told her to wait on the sidewalk. Id. Shortly after that they brought Jeremiah out in handcuffs and 
took him to jail. Id. The officer asked her if she would come down to the station and give them 
her statement. She told them that she needed to call Jeremiah's mother and let her know that he 
was in jail. Id. The officer asked if it could wait until after she gave him her statement which was 
apparently not recorded or transcribed. At trial, Officer Cox admitted that he had interviewed 
Jennifer and gave him a statement. No attempt was made to introduce the statement but the 
Officer was asked whether it was similar to the testimony that Jennifer had given at trial. Id at 
page 56. 
5. Jennifer then went home and called her husband's mother, the Appellant. Jeremiah had 
apparently talked with his mother because she informed Jennifer that he had taken parts out of 
her truck so that it would not start. The Appellant informed Jennifer that she was going down the 
next day to get the parts from him and asked her if she wanted to go talk to his probation officer 
to let him know what was going on. Id at page 13. The Appellant called her several times after 
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that asking Jennifer if she was sure that she felt Jeremiah was being abusive. The officer later 
checked on her that night and she told him the Appellant kept calling her and asking her 
questions about whether she thought he was being abusive and it made her feel a little 
uncomfortable. Id. He told her to just not answer the phone calls for the rest of the night. Id. 
6. The next morning, the Appellant came and picked up Jennifer to drive to Beaver to the 
jail to get the car parts from Jeremiah and to speak with his probation officer. They had a 
conversation in the car. Id. No one else was there. Id. It was just her and the Appellant. Id. The 
Appellant asked her again if she was sure if Jeremiah was abusing her, if she felt like she was in 
danger of him. Id. Jennifer said this was not the first time Jeremiah had put his hands on her in an 
abusive manner and that he scared her. Id. The Appellant then told her that due to his previous 
problems with the law something like this could cause him to go to prison and that if he were to 
go to prison, he would kill himself. Id at page 15. 
7. Jennifer testified that at this point she was sort of shocked. Id. She cared about him and 
she let Appellant know that she cared about him. Id. She stated she did not want him to go to 
prison but she did not want him to continue doing this to her. Id. She testified that Appellant 
asked her if she knew what it was to recant her statement. Id. Until then, she had no idea what the 
word "recant" meant. Id. The Appellant told her it is where she could go back in and tell them 
that she was not clear on her statement; that she was confused or upset or emotional, and she did 
not give them all the facts. Id. The Appellant asked Jennifer if she had to chance to keep 
Jeremiah out of prison, would she do it. Id. Jennifer asked Appellant what she meant by that. Id. 
Appellant told her that she needed to be imaginative. Id. Jennifer's testimony reads as follows: 
She's like "well, isn't it true that you cut yourself in the past?" I said, "Yes that's 
true. I have cut myself in the past." She said, "Well hypothetically—and I'm not telling 
you to do this, but hypothetically, what if you were trying to cut yourself, and Jeremiah 
was trying to get a knife away from you?" Id. 
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8. Jennifer told Appellant that she was not cutting herself and had not cut herself in a long 
time and he wasn't trying to get a knife away from her. Id. Jennifer testified that Appellant said: 
But hypothetically, could he have been trying to get a knife away from you, you 
know, if that could keep him from going to prison, do you think you would be able to go 
and tell them that you were confused on your statement; that you were upset and 
emotional, and you were embarrassed to let him know that you cut yourself and that he 
was just trying to protect you from yourself? Id at page 16. 
9. When they got to Beaver, Appellant went in to get Jennifer's part for her vehicle from 
Jeremiah. Id. Jennifer went in and spoke with his probation officer. Id. She told him that she was 
really upset and confused and that she was trying to cut herself and that Jeremiah was trying to 
take the weapon away from her so that she would not hurt herself. Id at 16 and 17. The probation 
officer told her that she needed to go and give her statement to the officer that she had spoken 
with the day before. Id at 17. When they got back, the Appellant dropped her off at her home and 
gave her the parts to her truck and she called dispatch to tell the officer to call her back. Id. When 
he did, she told him that there were some things that she needed to tell him about her statement 
that she had not been completely truthful. Id. He agreed to meet with her. Id at page 18. While at 
home, she cut herself on her leg so that she would have proof that Jeremiah was trying to protect 
her from herself. Id at 19. 
10. She met with the officer but he would not accept her statement telling her that she was 
lying and advising her that if she gave a false statement that she would be charged with giving a 
false statement. Id at page 20. This conversation was recorded. It is one that goes quickly from 
Jennifer trying to recant her previous statement to an interrogation where the officer presses her 
for details as to why she wanted to come in and change her story. The form of the interrogation 
makes use of a technique where the officer provides his own scenario as to what happened and 
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the person questioned is asked to acknowledge or deny it. By this method, the officer was able 
get Jennifer to acknowledge that the Appellant had asked her to lie for Jeremiah and that 
Appellant had told her not to tell anyone. Id. They had a real long talk about things that Jeremiah 
was doing to her and the way his family was treating her. He advised her a couple of times that 
she needed to get away from his family and asked her if she wanted to stick to her original 
statement. Id. Jennifer told him that she did and that she was sorry that she tried to come in and 
lie to him and the probation officer. Id at page 20. 
11. On cross-examination, Jennifer stated that she believed the first interview was not 
recorded. She did not sign a statement as to her interview then and does not recall having seen it 
in a written form thereafter. Moreover, she did not recall if the statement was under oath or not 
and she did not remember if an admonition was given to her that she could be prosecuted for 
perjury if she gave a false statement. Id at page 48 and 49. 
12. She was also questioned on this notion of being imaginative. The line of questioning 
went as follows: 
Q: So when Gracie [Appellant] said you need to be imaginative, you didn't have 
to use your imagination at all, did you? You knew exactly what you could tell the officer? 
A: When she - told me to be imaginative, I wasn't the one who came up with it. 
She said, "Hypothetically, you have cut yourself before. So hypothetically, what if 
Jeremiah was trying to get a knife away from you because you were cutting yourself? 
Q: But what I'm hearing is something suggested to you, and you're putting, 
basically, the form to what it is that she's suggesting. You already have the frame of 
reference to speak with; is that correct? She didn't tell you what to say. You said what 
you - you came up with what you needed to say. She basically didn't try to force you to 
make that statement; you made it on your own, right? 
A: She didn't force me to say it but she is the one who gave me ideas of what to 
say. 
Q: Okay, she gave you ideas of what to say. 
A: Yes, it is something I have done before. So when she brought it up, I knew 
exactly what I was talking about. 
Q: But I mean, --
A: But it's not something I would have done without her saying, "hypothetically, 
maybe he was trying to get a knife away from you, because hypothetically maybe you 
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were trying to cut yourself." Id at pages 29 and 30. 
13. Jennifer also accused her mother-in-law of assaulting her in October of the same year. 
At that time, Jeremiah and Jennifer were living in a trailer on the property owned by Appellant 
and her husband. Apparently, Jeremiah had some friends come over. A seventeen year-old boy 
and two girls, one was twenty-one years old and her sister who was sixteen years old. Id at pages 
63 and 64. They were drinking, listening to music and playing video games. Jennifer starting 
feeling nauseous and tired. She told Jeremiah that she would go back to the gas station at four 
o'clock in the morning to get him more beer but she was going to lay down until then. Jeremiah 
started having a conversation with the girls, telling them that he was not happy being married. 
Jennifer got upset with what he was saying. She gave him a look that said as much to him. 
Jeremiah and at least one of the girls left in their car. Id at 65. Jennifer went and asked the 
Appellant, her mother-in-law, if she could borrow her car to go into town and get cigarettes. She 
went looking for Jeremiah, trying to call him on the seventeen year-old's cell phone she had 
borrowed. When he finally answered, Jeremiah told her that their relationship was over. She went 
to the bank and withdrew the full amount which was in the amount of about $260.00. Id. 
14. When she got back to the trailer the other kids had left and Jeremiah had tried to call 
her several times demanding that she give him the money. Id. She refused. Id. The two had used 
her money for a car that had been given to them to transfer title to their name and to get a cell 
phone. Id at 66 and 67. When she stated that she would not give the money to him, he started 
slamming her into the bedroom door. He slammed her so hard that he broke the door. At that 
point, she fell down with him on top of her, him calling her a bunch of names, telling her it was 
over. He told her he wanted his wedding ring back and she wouldn't give it to him. He tried to 
take the wedding ring off her finger and told her that he would break it, cut it off if he had to. He 
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repeatedly took her head and slammed it into the coffee table and the door that was underneath 
her. Id at pages 67 and 68. 
15. At that point, the Appellant came in and pulled Jeremiah off her, telling him "you 
don't want to go to jail over this." Id. He told the Appellant about the money and Jennifer said 
that Appellant asked her where it was and told her to give it to him. Id. In exchange, she would 
have him give her the car and phone so she could leave. Id. Yelling went on back and forth about 
the money, the car and phone. Id. Jennifer said that Appellant called her a bunch of vulgar names 
and punched her in the eye. Id at 68. Jennifer said that when she tried to leave, the Appellant 
grabbed her by the hair and pulled her back causing her to fall onto the floor and reinjure her 
back. She said the Appellant kicked her, leaned over and hit her in the face several times. Id. This 
went back and forth for about forty-five minutes, "it was back forth with Jeremiah hitting me or 
choking me or pulling my hair and Gracie [Appellant] pulling him off of me. Then Gracie 
turning around and hitting me or pulling my hair or kicking me, and Jeremiah pulling her off of 
me." Id. Jennifer said that it was Appellant's idea for her to call her parents to pick her up. Id at 
69. Jennifer called her parents and arranged to be picked up later that day. She said Jeremiah took 
her to their bedroom and told her to start packing whatever things she needed. Id. Appellant came 
into the bedroom and starting saying that if she said anything to the cops she would make sure 
that she paid for him going to jail. Id at 70. 
16. As she was getting into her parents' truck, an officer approached and questioned her 
about her appearance at the gas station. Id at 74. He told Jennifer that he knew that she was 
married to Jeremiah and asked if he was living out on Appellant's land. Id. He asked what 
happened. Jennifer would not say anything. Id. Her mother told her she needed to answer his 
questions. Id. The officer asked Jennifer if Jeremiah had did this to her and she told him no. Id. 
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He asked her who did this to her and she told him it was the Appellant. Id. He asked if it was just 
the Appellant and Jennifer said, "it was just Grace." Id at page 75. 
17. Moments later, another officer showed up and asked her if he could take pictures of 
the bruises and if Jennifer would give him her statement of what happened. Id. She again told the 
officer everything she had told the other and that she testified to, later except for Jeremiah's 
involvement. Id. Photos were introduced as evidence at trial. However, these were inconsistent 
with her testimony about Appellant's involvement. In cross-examination, distinction was drawn 
as to why the interview in this case was different from that which occurred in July. In pertinent 
part it reads: 
Q: In fact, your interview here, it's not much of an interview, you're doing all the 
talking. Have you read your interview? 
A: No, I haven't. 
Q: I mean, it's pretty much you narrating what happened, nobody's asking you 
questions here. You're just telling them what happened. 
A: I know that. 
Q: So you narrate the statement. They take the statement down. There's no 
mention of you being beat on for forty-five minutes. There's no mention of anything that 
Jeremiah did. There's no mention of you getting kicked in the back by Grace. None of 
that's mentioned in the statement. Why would you not put in your statement? 
A: Well, I apologize. I did—thought I said something about her kicking me in the 
back or stepping on my back in the statement. Obviously I had bruises on my back from 
that. Id at 92. 
18. Thereafter, Jennifer was further cross-examined by Mr. Jackson: 
Q: Let's talk about the bruises. I see the hand. 
A: Yes. 
Q: No mention in your testimony about something happening to your hand. 
A: Okay. 
Q: Okay. Well, what happened to your hand? 
A: That's where I was defending myself, blocking my face from getting hit. 
Q: I see. So is this where Jeremiah was hitting you, or when Grace was hitting 
you? Now, tell us the truth today. 
A: It was from when Jeremiah was hitting me. 
Q: Alright. I'm looking at that. I don't see any bruises there. Do you? 
A: I see my lip's swollen and I see my eye's swollen. 
Q: You said you had a ring—you said you had a -
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A: I did, and I also said that because my lip was swollen, I had to take the lip ring 
out because it was splitting it. 
Q: I see. So that's what this photo is referring to, is the fact that your lip is 
swelled? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Okay. I see a slight bruise around the eye; is that what you see? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Is that where you say you got hit? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you're—it's your testimony that Grace hit you with her fist? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Jeremiah didn't hit you? 
A: Jeremiah did not hit me in the face. 
Q: Now is this the bruise you're referring to on the back? 
A: I couldn't see my back. All I got told from my mom is that I had a bruise on 
my back. 
Q: Well, do you see any bruises on your back? 
A: I see a mark there. 
Q: And is it your back? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Alright. What's that referring to? 
A: That was where I got hit in the eye. 
Q: Alright, so Jeremiah hit you in the eye? 
A: No, Jeremiah didn't hit me in the eye. 
Q: So Grace didn't hit you once; she punched you twice? 
A: I said that, that Grace had me on the floor and had hit me several times in the 
face after she had punched me. Id at 94. 
19. The station attendant that called the police remembered that the victim was "walking 
really funny—like her hip kept popping out, kind of. She looked kind of torn up." Id at 201. The 
attendant said she was just sad. She had been crying. That she looked like she had been through a 
hard time. She didn't remember noticing any bruising. Id at pages 103 and 104. 
20. The Appellant testified at trial. Her memory of the conversation driving to Beaver was 
different from her daughter-in-law's. She stated: 
A: She was really quiet, and we got back to Minersville, and she said—I'm trying 
to remember how she phrased it but she says, "What if Jeremiah was trying to take 
something away from me?" I said, "okay, and?" She said - and she pulled a razor blade 
out of her purse, and it had a drop of blood on it, then she said that she was—she was 
trying to cut herself. I asked her why would she do that, and she said that because she 
does that when she gets depressed. 
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Q: Was this the first time that you'd heard that she did that? 
A: Yes. Id at page 160... 
Q: And at anytime did you say to her that you'd - give her a story, hypothetically 
speaking? 
A: No I did not. 
Q: Did you tell her to be imaginative? 
A: No, I did not. 
Q: Did you tell her that she could recant her statement? 
A: No, I never told her anything like that. 
Q: You're—when you take her to the — when you took her to the probation 
officer, what was your intention? What was the reason for you going over there in the 
first place? 
A: We had come over to visit Jeremiah, and I had actually went over to the 
County Attorney's Office, and she came over to I think Ian's office [probation officer] 
when I was over there. 
Q: At any time did you threaten her in any way about recanting her statement? 
A: No, I did not. 
Q: Okay. So basically she goes in and she sees the probation officer, she comes 
back out, you take her back to Milford? 
A: Yeah. Well, she was crying and she was all upset and said that Ian was mad. 
That's pretty much all she said. I said, "Well, you just need to tell the truth." I said, " 
Both of you--" "excuse the language, but I said—"You need to pull your heads out of 
your backsides and tell the truth and get your life straight, and get counseling," because 
they had already been in arguments before. 
Q: Alright, and you go back to Milford. Then what happened? Did you just drop 
her off? 
A: Yeah, I dropped her off at Chuck and Jen's, and I don't know if it's the next 
day, that night or whatever, I had an officer and they came and arrested me for witness 
tampering. Id at 162. 
21. Regarding the alleged assault, the Appellant testified as follows: 
About three or four in the morning, Craig and I were awakened. Jeremiah's little 
car was peeling out of the driveway. Craig and I got up and we were sitting there. We 
went up and turned the T.V. on, and there was music going on. 
A few minutes after that Jennifer came over and asked if she could borrow my -
the keys to my car to go get a soda, because KB opens at four. So it would probably have 
been around that time. 
Yeah, sure. 
She left. She was gone, I don't know, fifteen or twenty minutes. She came back 
and came to the house and brought me the keys. Craig and I continued sitting there just 
watching TV, and the music got really, really loud over there. Our bedroom like faces his 
trailer, and Craig had to get up at five o'clock. So I said "I'm going to go over and tell 
them kids to knock it off." 
I went over there and Jennifer was there, Corban- Vivienne McKnight's boy— 
and another girl who I did not know. There were somewhere between twenty or thirty 
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beer bottles all over the tables and the floors and I lost it. I told, I - and I asked Corban, 
because I know him, and I said, "does your mother know where you're at?" He said, 
"yeah, she knows, I'm spending the night." I said, "does she know you're drinking?" 
I told the kids, and I also told Jennifer that they needed to pack their crap and get 
out, because no one was drinking on the property. Craig and I were not going to be 
responsible. I tried to get a hold of Corban's parents, which I finally did, and I know that 
Vivienne—or maybe it's Colby that came out and got Corban. The girls walked down to 
the end of the lane. I don't know what—ultimately they ended up back home. 
I went back to the house and told Craig what was going on with the kids and the 
booze? And sometime after that Jeremiah's little car, I heard it come back in, and then we 
heard Jeremiah and Jennifer screaming and hollering and doors slamming. Then the little 
black car left again. 
Finally when all the noise was gone, Craig and I went to bed. About—I think it 
was 8:30,1 don't know what time for sure, I got a phone call from the Sheriffs office that 
an officer wanted to talk to me. I looked down at the end of the lane and there were two 
Sheriffs vehicles and I called my husband and said, "I bet I'm going to jail and I don't 
know what for." Id at 164 and 165. 
22. Jeremiah McFall also testified at trial, his testimony consists of two pages. He simply 
denies assaulting his wife or seeing his mother assault his wife. Id at pages 139 and 140. 
Notwithstanding, the testimony appears to have been significant for the Court. In rejecting 
defense counsel's argument of reasonable alternative hypothesis the Court states: 
While this case presents an interesting dilemma, which of Mr. McFall's 
lies do I believe today? That's difficult, because I have no question that Mr. McFall is 
lying. So then I have to try to somehow find where he's telling the truth. Obviously, one 
aspect, one issue—one element that I can look for is to try to conceive of whether or not 
he would think there is some benefit to lying. 
At any rate, this is what I find. First of all, the - 1 don't believe that the elements 
of the crime of tampering with a witness require that I find that any threats were made, or 
that there was a specific request to lie. I believe the statute simply indicates that there has 
to be an attempt to induce or otherwise cause another person to testify falsely or to 
withhold evidence. I'm paraphrasing. Id at 184. 
He further states: 
While there—I am persuaded that there are certain aspects, including the amount 
of time involved in the assault, that I believe Ms. McFall may not have accurately 
recalled, I do believe that she had at least accurately recalled and testified that Ms. Davie 
struck her, in the — and that is consistent with Ms. Davie's demeanor on the witness 
stand, and consistent with statements that she had made with regard to her desire to, and 
willingness to stand up for her son when she believes he's right. 
The only thing that's inconsistent with that conclusion is Ms. Davie's statements, 
16 
and quite frankly, I don't believe her. Id at 186. 
23. The Appellant was ordered to cooperate to the preparation of a presentence 
investigation report. Sentencing was not until January, 2010, because of her medical condition 
and medications that she was on. Due to this, arrangements were made for her to serve a 
combination of jail time and home confinement. See the Record at 116. 
24. The date of sentencing was continued once because of Appellant's poor health. She 
elaborated on her medical problems at the time of sentencing. See sentencing hearing transcript 
at pages 5 and 6, in the record at 146. She also informed the Court of her chronic physical 
condition and anticipated major surgery. Id page 7. She informed the Court that she had the 
primary responsibility for caring for at least one grandchild. Id at page 9. She also informed the 
Court that because of the medication she takes, for her to serve incarceration presented 
extraordinary problems to Beaver County Jail trouble in dealing with. Id at page 11. The 
prosecutor recommended prison under such circumstances primarily for that reason. That 
Appellant would not be able to receive the medical attention that the Beaver County Correctional 
Facility was not set up to deal with. Id. 
25. Under the circumstances, the presentence investigation report came back harshly in 
light of her past criminal history. See the Record at 119. The general matrix placed her at a 
category two and the recommendation was for 180 days in the Beaver County Jail. The trial court 
judge made a downward departure ordering the Appellant to serve 120 days, ninety of which 
were to be stayed if she served thirty days at five-day increments spread out over several weeks. 
Id at 37. The pertinent part of the Court order follows: 
If you serve each of those five days, and you're not a problem with regard to the 
jail staff, then I'm going to stay the rest of the sentence. If you don't, if there's a problem, 
if the jail reports to me that there is a problem, then obviously we can have a hearing to 
see if there's really a problem, but if you don't do what you're required to do in terms of 
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serving that thirty days—and that would be thirty days without any good time. It would be 
a full thirty days—but if you don't do that, then the balance of the sentence would be 
imposed; or if it's—the violation is egregious enough, then I may very order that you 
serve—that you - your probation be revoked and you be sent to prison. Id. 
26. There was control on prescriptions ordering that she maintain one physician and one 
pharmacy, for all prescriptions to be reported to AP&P within twenty-four hours of receipt. Even 
though neither offense involved the use of alcohol or drugs by the Appellant, she was prohibited 
from consuming or possessing any alcoholic beverages or going to locations where consumption 
of alcohol was the primary activity or alcohol is the chief item of sale. This included using any 
medication that contained alcohol, including Nyquil. Id at 38. She was ordered to bring in her 
prescriptions and they needed to be up to date medications in prescription bottles. Otherwise, the 
medication would not be prescribed while she served time. Id at 41. 
27. The trial court's judgment, sentence, order staying execution of sentence and order of 
probation was entered on the 10th day of March, 2010, see the Record at 149; see also Addendum 
Exhibit "A", attached. 
28. She was violated on probation thereafter for having guns in her home, the initial 
violation was dismissed but additional charges were filed against her these were also dismissed 
when federal charges were brought. The Appellant was not able to complete the terms of 
probation due to the inference caused by law enforcement and subsequent arrest. She was, 
however, credited with twenty-four days and given six days good time, committed time 
complete, contrary to the Court's order see the Record at 166. 
29. Notice of Appeal was filed on the 23rd day of February, 2010, together with a request 
for transcripts. See the Record at 39 and 41. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. 
After marshalling the evidence presented at trial, it is nonetheless insufficient to support 
the judgment and the bench trial court was not correct in its assessment of the facts. In this case, 
inducement should be interpreted to ensure fair notice, to exclude action that is not criminal and 
to clarify the parameters of enforcement. The judge in this case was predisposed to disbelieve the 
testimony of Jeremiah McFall which clouded his perspective or the proper weighing of the 
evidence. The trial court refused to consider the alternative hypothesis theory and this affected 
how to view reasonable doubt. The court's findings on credibility are not supported by the clear 
weight of the evidence. The victim did not recant her statement. 
B. 
The trial court abused its discretion at sentencing, taking into account factors not present 
in the case and not folly appreciating the medical circumstances of the Appellant. Her medication 
condition and medication should not have been fettered. Her jail sentence should have accounted 
for her present use of medication or physicians care. Appellant would suffer cruel and unusual 
punishment to require that she serve without her medication. 
ARGUMENTS 
A, 
AFTER MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL, IT IS 
NONETHELESS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT AND THE BENCH 
TRIAL COURT WAS NOT CORRECT IN ITS ASSESSMENT OF THE FACTS. 
This was a one-day bench trial and the facts and circumstances were not extensive. 
Counsel for Appellant has attempted to marshal the evidence by reproducing a substantial portion 
of it as the Statement of Facts. This constitutes the Record. However, there is other information 
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that would have been helpful to the trial court judge and likely had an impact on his decision. 
This is evident from the findings made whereupon the trial court judge makes no reservation in 
commenting upon his past dealings, particularly as they pertain to Jeremiah McFall. These two 
pages of testimony appear to become the divining rod upon which the judge relies to thereafter 
conclude and make findings that the Appellant was guilty of the first count of witness tampering 
and assault. It is also the basis upon which the trial court dismisses the second count of witness 
tampering. 
Notwithstanding, the judge realized that the evidence for conviction on any charge in this 
case rested solely in the testimony of Jennifer McFall. Interestingly, he makes findings as to why 
she is more creditable, however, the findings are inconsistent, more or less stating that she was 
mistaken in part of her testimony and unmistaken as to other parts. The Court makes reference to 
the photos as corroborating of the victim when they do not, stating that the officer's testimony 
was inconsistent with the testimony of the Appellant when it was not. The matter is, however, 
one that involves mixed issues of fact and law and is subject to review as a claim of insufficient 
evidence of a bench trial judgment. Therefore, the Court of Appeals sustains the trial court's 
judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence. See State v. Hartman, 2004 UT 
App. 175; see also State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App. 106, 999 P.2d 1252. When the case involves a 
mixed question of fact and law, the Utah Supreme Court affords some measure of discretion to 
the trial court's application of the law. The measure of discretion afforded varies, however, 
according to the issue being reviewed. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, paragraph 26, 63 P.3d 
650. When issues on appeal present questions of statutory interpretation, the proper interpretation 
of the statute is a question of law and reviewed for correctness. See Rustin v. Salt Lake County, 
1999 UT 36, paragraph 17, 977 P.2d 1201. This Court affords no deference to legal conclusions 
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of the trial court but reviews them for correctness. In the instant case, the language that is called 
into question is that which is found in Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-8-508(1) (1953, as 
amended) in which the judge referred is "attempts to induce or otherwise cause another person 
to". See trial transcript at page 184, in the record at 145. 
Point No. 1 
INDUCEMENT SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO ENSURE FAIR NOTICE AND NOT LEFT 
TO LAW ENFORCEMENT TO DETERMINE SCOPE OF ENFORCEMENT. 
The question in this case is one of statutory interpretation and Appellant believes one of 
first impression at least in the context of the statutory charge for tampering with a witness, a third 
degree felony. In this case, the language is overbroad or vague. In order to establish that a 
complaint of statutory provision is impermissibly vague the Appellant must demonstrate either 
(1) that the statute does not provide the kind of notice that enables ordinary people to understand 
what conduct is prohibited or (2) that the statute encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. See State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4; 84 P.3d 1171. Considering the meaning of the 
statutory provision, the analysis begins with the plain language of the provision. The Court need 
not look beyond the plain language unless it finds some ambiguity in it. Moreover, the plain 
language of a statute is to be read as a whole and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other 
provisions in the same statute and with other statutes around the same and related chapters. In 
that regard, this case offers a unique set of circumstances. On the one hand, testimony offered by 
the victim herself regarding statements made or actions taken by the Appellant take the form of 
suggestions or are posed as hypothetical examples. This construes the statute as one where to 
induce could include subtle means of persuasion or encouragement. Simply encouraging the 
victim to do the right thing could have the same impact of inducement as suggesting a course of 
action consistent with the desires of the person soliciting information from the offender. Such an 
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interpretation calls into question the constitutionality of the statute. See Provo City v. Whatcott 
2000 UT App. 86, 1 P.3d 1113, when this Court concluded a statute was overbroad concerning 
telephone harassment when not aimed specifically at evils within the allowable area of state 
control. 
Notwithstanding, a closer reading of inducement finds it stated in the context of 
"attempting to induce or otherwise cause another person to (a) testify or inform falsely." The 
definition of the word is qualified to some degree by the context of the phrase. Since the word 
itself is not adequately defined, it opens interpretation for law enforcement to decide upon its 
scope and implication. 
This case offers a comparison. While the evidence points to suggestion or indirect 
persuasion of the victim by the Appellant, techniques for interrogating her applied by law 
enforcement to keep her from recanting her statement were more forceful. In fact, law 
enforcement did not ask her as much as get her to acknowledge what they believed to have 
occurred through the use of presenting scenarios. Apparently law enforcement has the ability to 
discern in all cases who is telling the truth and then is not limited on their own use of persuasion 
to keep one from recanting. It is allowed as well to utilize its own techniques and methods to 
procure the information necessary for persecution. 
Likewise, the phrase includes the use of the qualifying term attempt which has been 
defined to require proof of a substantial step toward the commission of the offence as strongly 
corroborative of the actor's mental intent. State v. Ansari and Lagana, 2004 UT App. 326; 100 
P.3d 231. This Court considered the matter in the context of the charge of enticement of a minor 
stating that it is not that a defendant merely injects doubt as to the meaning of words where no 
doubt would be felt by the normal reader. The terms of the statute need not provide mathematical 
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certainty and may be "marked by flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous 
specificity as long as it is clear what the ordinance as a whole prohibits. It was clear in that case 
because of the nature of the activity but is not so clear in this one. The problem in this case is the 
same is with entrapment, the evidence raises a reasonable doubt that the Appellant freely and 
voluntarily committed the offense. Moreover, there is the suggestion that inducement was 
connected with and partly responsive for improper police conduct. The tactics used by law 
enforcement were not only forceful but the victim had made no formal statement. She simply 
reported an altercation. She was not told by law enforcement that she couldn't alter or recant her 
statement. Law enforcement set her up to be interrogated and the second interview caused her 
Miranda rights to be read and waived. The form of interrogation calls into question whether the 
victim freely and voluntarily made a statement of witness tampering by acknowledging scenarios 
assumed and presented by law enforcement. Clearly, statutory language without restriction in 
terms of defining inducement leaves too broad a scope for enforcement to be arbitrarily applied 
by local agencies. 
Point No. 2 
PREDISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE REGARDING JEREMIAH McFALL 
CLOUDED HIS PERSPECTIVE AND TRIAL COURT ERRED IN WEIGHING THE 
EVIDENCE. 
The trial court judge in this case does not mince words about his opinion of the 
truthfulness of the testimony of Jeremiah McFall. What is more interesting is that Jeremiah 
McFall did not do anything of consequence. He simply denied seeing any of it take place. Direct 
and cross-examination covered two pages in the trial transcript. The judge spends that much time 
or more explaining how this caused it to consider McFall's motivation for testifying which it 
concludes was to protect his mother. The reasoning of the Court then transcends to believing the 
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victim when she said she was moved to recant her statement but mistaken when details of timing 
or conflicting physical evidence of injuries were concerned. The trial court has no problem with 
the fact that her testimony was inconsistent with the original statement regarding the assault, her 
lying to protect the very person that the trial court is convinced is not telling the truth, Jeremiah 
McFall. It sees no reason for scrutinizing the techniques used by law enforcement to take the 
victim's statement or evidence or photographs except to make a specific finding that it has no 
reason to believe that law enforcement is lying. The affirmative findings attempting to bolster the 
credibility of Jennifer McFall and the officers under these circumstances are almost telling 
because it is obvious to any reasonable review of the case and causes one to question what the 
judge was thinking. The clear weight of the evidence establishes her testimony as unreliable at 
best. The conclusions reached by the trial court are clearly erroneous. It's method in weighing the 
evidence dramatically eschews proper assessment due in part by its predisposition and disbelief 
of the individual that it felt most responsible. 
Point No. 3 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT WAS FLAWED CONSIDERING FOR SUFFICIENCY 
OF EVIDENCE THAT IT REFUSED TO CONSIDER OR DID NOT EFFECTIVELY 
ELIMINATE AS A POSSIBILITY, DEFENSE COUNSEL'S ASSERTION OF THE 
REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS AS AN APPROPRIATE APPLICATION 
FOR THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD. 
Another interesting aspect of this case concerns just how the facts beg for interpretation. 
It was argued that a fair inference from the evidence could be drawn that Jeremiah McFall 
assaulted his wife and caused the injuries that she first accused the Appellant in doing, 
acknowledging that she had lied to law enforcement about his involvement and testifying at trial 
that he did not assault her. This becomes an issue of reasonable doubt. Defense counsel 
24 
advocated that the trial court consider the matter in the context of a reasonable alternative to the 
evidence supported as just as likely to have happened as the allegations upon which the 
Appellant was accused. The trial court rejects this consideration stating that in order for it to be 
reasonable, it has to be supported by reliable, believable and competent evidence. See trial 
transcript at page 84, in the Record at 195. That is not a proper application of the principle. The 
evidence can be no more reliable, believable or competent than that which is presented in 
attempting to establish the allegations for the offense. It makes no sense to disregard application 
of the theory upon the assumption that the evidence is unreliable but not holding the evidence to 
the same standard when scrutinizing the allegations or elements of the offense. In fact, it could be 
argued that the reverse should be applied. The State has a burden of proving evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt, any evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable doubt whether it meets that 
standard of proof or not is sufficient. However, by not considering the reasonable alternative 
which in this case was that Jeremiah McFall was the one who had assaulted his wife causing 
bruising and other physical injury, the trial court has restricted or limited its inspection of the 
evidence to such an extent and limitation as to disallow consideration of reasonable doubt. 
Herewith, there is reasonable doubt in this case as it is just as likely that the injuries and assault 
occurred at the hand of the victim's husband. There is no reasonable basis upon which not to 
consider it and, the trial court's inspection of the facts was flawed in that the evidence itself is 
insufficient to support the charges. The evidence does not sustain the judgment. The trial court 
judge was ineffective in attempting to qualify his findings and turn them upon credibility rather 
than sufficiency. 
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Point No. 4 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING REGARDING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE VICTIM IS 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
In this case, the trial court makes findings to support the conclusion that the victim's 
testimony is credible. The judge declares that he believes her when the victim claims that she was 
assaulted by the Appellant but he doesn't believe her testimony regarding length of time or other 
aspects of her testimony. The trial court seems to suggest that this is some sort of mistaken 
memory regarding necessary details. However, such a position is contrary to the evidence 
presented. Regarding the alleged assault upon her, the victim did not forget facts. Rather, she 
made a false statement to law enforcement, one accusing Appellant but protecting her husband. It 
was not an oversight, it was a deliberate attempt on her part to direct the investigation away from 
the one most likely to have caused the bruising and injuries, her husband. Most disconcerting, is 
the timing of it all. In the weeks before, Appellant had been arrested for witness tampering. The 
victim knew this. She saw how easy it was to shift the blame from herself to the Appellant when 
she tried to change her testimony regarding the prior assault with her husband. This was, for all 
intents and purposes, an extension of manipulating her testimony to implicate someone she knew 
that law enforcement was likely to believe responsible and away from the one who actually did it. 
A tell tale sign of this is found in the form of the statement. Where before officers interrogated 
her and presented scenarios. To these, she acknowledged but in the case of the assault, the victim 
narrates the story without there being so much as a single question. The officer asks if her 
husband was involved and she denies it outright. Later, she informs her husband of the interview 
and tells him that she kept him out of it. To qualify such conduct as oversight or mistake ignores 
completely the character of the testimony of the victim. Confessing to have done so at trial does 
not bolster her credibility in testifying rather, it reveals the length to which she will go in further 
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manipulating the truth. The rest of the evidence points to her husband as the one who committed 
the crime not the Appellant. Under the circumstances, the trial court erred in attempting to turn 
the issue into one of credibility by making findings accordingly. Instead, it is a case where the 
evidence is insufficient to support the charge as against the Appellant. 
Point No. 5 
REGARDING THE WITNESS TAMPERING CHARGE, THE VICTIM NEVER RECANTED. 
Accounting for all facts concerning the charge of witness tampering the one most glaring 
is that the victim never recanted. One might argue that the statute only requires an attempt to be 
made. However, an attempt is usually defined as requiring proof of a substantial step toward the 
commission of the offense. In this case, there is no such proof. Even considering the testimony of 
the victim and disregarding that completely of the Appellant, at best there is only a suggestion 
offered in the form of a hypothetical. A suggestion is no more inducing then if the Appellant had 
instead suggested that she go in and correct her statement to tell the truth. If making suggestions 
is all that is necessary to meet the requirement for the crime, then upon what basis does one 
exclude nonverbal gestures from the context of inducement. In that light, the Appellant driving 
the victim over to meet with the probation officer and back to Milford could have qualified for 
inducement if left to law enforcement to define the scope and application of the term. The 
potential for abuse in application is undeniable. In the case of the Appellant, given the conduct of 
the officers in interrogating the victim, it is clear that if defining inducement is left to them, the 
Appellant could have been charged for any show of support or assistance she rendered to the 
victim. Under such circumstances, this Court must limit the construction of the term to ensure 
that the statute does not sweep within its ambit activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute 




THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AT SENTENCING, TAKING INTO 
ACCOUNT FACTORS NOT PRESENT IN THE CASE AND NOT FULLY 
APPRECIATING THE MEDICAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE APPELLANT. 
The trial court judge has broad discretion in sentencing. See State v. Smith, 842 P.2d 908 
(Utah 1992). However, the exercise of that discretion is not unlimited and may not be exercised 
on the basis of unreliable information. State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985). At first 
glance, the sentence in this case appears to be a reasonable one. In fact, it qualifies as a 
downward departure from the recommendation made by Adult Probation and Parole. However, 
the recommendation made was a harsh one in light of her circumstances. Even considering the 
evidence in a light favorable to the trial court's judgment, recommending 180 days jail seems 
beyond the pale. Nevertheless, the trial court's sentence presents similar concerns as those found 
regarding drug addicts in Robinson v. California, 370 US 660 663 (1962). In this case, Appellant 
contends that the sentence is cruel and unusual because of her medical conditions requiring the 
use of certain medications and access to medical attention. First, it confined her to home while 
requiring that she serve thirty days without good time. Second, it restricted her use of doctors and 
medication when the circumstances of the case were completely unrelated. In fact, there was not 
even an inference that one could have been drawn from the facts that the Appellant had in any 
way misused medication or inappropriately made use of medical professionals. The reason for 
the trial court doing this came from the fact that the jail had nearly killed her on a prior occasion 
because they wouldn't give to her the prescribed medication she was on when having to serve 
jail. This was a matter that was discussed at sentencing but there was no evidence presented. The 
argument made by the State was completely unreliable yet this becomes the basis for the 
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sentence. Along the same line, the Appellant was ordered not to use alcohol or drugs. Again, the 
circumstances of the case do not even imply that the use of alcohol or drugs was a factor. As a 
point of clarification, the Appellant does not use alcohol. The drugs she uses are those prescribed 
by doctors treating her for cancer of the esophagus or stomach. The sentence in this case was not 
only unusual but cruel in the sense that it would likely impact both her physical and mental 
health if she was denied the use of prescribed medication or access to more than one doctor. Still, 
the trial court's order fails to fully appreciate the nature of some of Appellant's disability. 
Without her medication, what might to others be punishment fit and proper for the crime turns 
out for her to be a torture chamber with pain so excruciating that it has on at least one prior 
occasion proven to be life-threatening. On the other hand, to have her serve the jail time and 
allow her the use of the medication while incarcerated, leads to her having to be quarantined, 
having no interaction with people whether inmates or security personnel. Such isolation for one 
who is prescribed medication for depression or anxiety turns the experience from one of isolation 
into a chamber of horrors. In that case, five days can seem like an eternity. With Appellant such 
confinement would have been unbearable. It goes without saying that the judge should have the 
power to assess proper punishment for each individual defendant convicted in his court. The 
Appellant does not question the trial court's broad discretion in doing so. However, the Appellant 
asserts that in this particular case, the Court's actions were in error that it gave weight to 
information that was unreliable or not properly before it and did not fully appreciate the medical 
circumstances of Appellant. In light of that, the Appellant requests that the remaining jail time, 
restrictions on medical care and conditions of the probation agreement relating thereto be 
strickened or modified to allow Appellant to receive continued healthcare and not have her 
medical health compromised in the course of punishment that is effected by unnecessary 
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suffering or hardship. 
CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, the Appellant requests that the matter 
be remanded with instructions or reversed the verdict of the jury together with such other and 
further relief as to this Court appears equitable and proper. 
DATED this ^ f 7 d»y of ^ ° ~ ^ 2010. 
J. BRYAJK JACKSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
10 MAR 21* PH ^ 5 1 
BEAVER COUNrY 
LEO G. KANELL BY Jifi 
Deputy Beaver County Attorney 
P. O. Box 471 
Beaver, Utah 84713 
Telephone: (435) 438-6441 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAVER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, 
ORDER STAYING EXECUTION 
Plaintiff, : OF SENTENCE AND ORDER 
OF PROBATION 
vs. : 
GFLACE HELEN DAVIE, : Criminal No. 081500074 
Defendant. : 
The above entitled matter having regularly come on for Sentencing before the 
Honorable G. MICHAEL WESTFALL, Judge of the Fifth Judicial District Court, on the 27th day 
of January, 2010, and the Defendant, GRACE HELEN DAVIE being present and represented by 
her attorney, J. BRYAN JACKSON, and the State of Utah being represented by LEO G. KANELL, 
Deputy Beaver County Attorney, and Defendant's Counsel having made a statement in mitigation 
of sentence, and the Defendant having been given the opportunity to make a statement in her own 
behalf, and the Court having reviewed the recommendations made in a pre-sentence report prepared 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, 
now makes and enters the following JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, ORDER STAYING EXECUTION 
OF SENTENCE and ORDER. 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant, GRACE 
HELEN DAVIE, is guilty of the charge of COUNT 1: TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Section 76-8-508(1); and COUNT 3: ASSAULT, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Section 76-5402, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 1953. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant be 
sentenced on COUNT 1: to Imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for 0-5 years, fined, $5,000.00, 
plus an 85% surcharge, and a court security fee of $33.00; and on COUNT 3: ASSAULT, a class A 
misdemeanor, to one (1) year in the Beaver County Jail, fined $2500.00, plus an 85% surcharge, and 
a court security fee of $33.00. Said sentences to run concurrently and to be served at Utah State 
Prison. 
ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that execution of the 




IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED ANUDECKEED that said Defendant, 
GRACE HELEN DAVIE is hereby placed on probation for a period of thirty six (36) months under 
the supervision of Adult Probation and Parole, strictly upon the following terms, provisions and 
conditions: 
1. That Defendant shall obey all laws. 
2. That Defendant shall pay a fine, including surcharge, in the amount of $750.00, plus a 
$66.00 court security fee. 
3. That Defendant shall serve one hundred twenty (120) days in the Beaver County Jail, 
ninety (90) days of which will be stayed by the Court providing the Defendant successfully serves 
thirty (30) days in five (5) day increments with no good time. The ninety (90) days will be stayed 
upon the completion of the thirty days. Defendant is to report to the jail on February 8,2010, at 7:00 
p.m. to be released Saturday, February 13,2010, at 7:00 p.m., and thereafter as agreed to by the jail. 
4. That Defendant shall be under House Arrest during the time she is serving thirty (30) days 
in jail, and is not physically incarcerated. Defendant shall be allowed to attend church services 
for medical treatment, and counseling. 
5. That Defendant shall continue her mental health counseling, and shall be released to 
attend counseling, and shall provide the Court with proof of completion. 
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6. That Defendant shall not use or possess any alcohol, energy drinks, or liquids, such as 
NyquiL, containing alcohol while on probation. Defendant shall not frequent any establishment 
wher^ilcohol is the chief items of sale, or consumption of alcohol is the primary activity. 
cc 7. That Defendant shall not use or possess any drugs during herprobation period that are not 
prescnbedby her physician. That prescribed drugs taken into the jail facility shall be in their original 
?I o 
containers? 
"s- 8. That Defendant shall comply with a 9:00 pjn. to 6:00 ajn. curfew during the period of 
house arrest, and thereafter, as adjusted at the discretion of Adult Probation and Parole. 
9. That Defendant shall enter into a written agreement with the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole, containing such provision as that agency may prescribe, and strictly comply 
with the terms thereof, including terms that are not specifically mentioned in this Order ofProbation. 
10. That Defendant shall have no contact with the victim, Jennifer McFail. 
Defendant is advised that she has thirty (30) days from and after January 27,2010, to appeal 
this judgment and sentence or any part thereof. Such appeal shall be pursuant to the Rules of 
Criminal and Civil Procedure and the laws of the State of Utah. 
DATED this J V d a y dfPebrc^v, 2010. f^ 
BY THE COURT, 
APPROVED AS TO 
FORM AND CONTENT 
J. SRYAlN JACKSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
OMCHAEL WESTFALL 
^District Court Judge 
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